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Abstract
This study investigates the impact of the separate elements of corporate governance on enterprise
financial performance explained in three separate models (ROA, ROE, and Debt Ratio) for nonfinancial companies present within the S&P Pan Arab Composite Index. The data on corporate
governance choices includes 225 firms for ten years from 2006 to 2015 gathered from ORBIS,
Reuters Eikon, Datastream, as well as, annual and board reports. The firms included in this study
are all listed respective to their country‘s stock exchange, which are present in eleven Arab
countries namely: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates. The corporate governance variables are divided into
board structure variables (which includes Board size, Board independence, Duality Separation,
and Diversity), ownership structure variables (which includes Ownership concentration, Direct
ownership, Institutional ownership, and Foreign ownership), and controlled variables (which
includes Firm size, Firm age, Industry type, Auditor type, as well as country Foreign exchange,
Inward FDI, Outward FDI, GDP and Revolution). Furthermore, the topic attempts to understand
the significance of the Arab Spring uprising on firm performance using the ROA and ROE
measurements and debt ratio as a measurement of firm leverage. Furthermore, the data is used to
compare the corporate governance variables five years before the Arab Spring uprising to the
five years during/after the uprising.
Regression results are demonstrated in the form of models. Model 1 shows the effect of
corporate governance on firm performance measured by ROA. Results show that there is a
significant positive relationship with board size, institutional ownership, audit type on firm
performance measured by ROA, also there a significant negative relationship with duality,
foreign ownership, firm size and the revolution variable on firm performance measured by ROA.
Model 2 shows the effect of corporate governance on firm performance measured by ROE.
Results show that there is a significant positive relationship with board size, institutional
ownership, audit type on firm performance measured by ROE, also there a significant negative
relationship with duality, firm size and the revolution variable on firm performance measured by
ROE. Model 3 shows the effect of corporate governance on firm performance measured by Debt
Ratio. Results show that there is a significant positive relationship with director ownership,
foreign ownership, firm size, foreign exchange rate and the revolution variable on firm
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performance measured by Debt Ratio, also there a significant negative relationship with duality,
institutional ownership and firm age on firm performance measured by ROE.
After conducing Mann-Whitney U test, results shows that the variables ROA, ROE, ownership
concentration, director ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, firm size, firm
age, foreign exchange rate, outward foreign direct investment, inward foreign direct investment
and GDP are all statistically significant. The variables ROA, ROE, foreign exchange rate,
outward foreign direct investment and inward foreign direct investment were a higher mean rank
before the Arab Spring uprising compared to during/after the Arab Spring uprising. On the other
hand, the variables ownership concentration, director ownership, institutional ownership, foreign
ownership, firm size, firm age and GDP were a higher mean rank during/after the Arab Spring
uprising compared to before the Arab Spring uprising.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
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1. Introduction
Corporate Governance commonly refers to the established codes and guidelines that determine
how a company should function and operate. The company‘s board of directors implements the
corporate governance process by approving and constant reviewing of such guidelines, as well
as, make sure that it is aligned with the company‘s regulatory practices, direction, and
performance.
Corporate governance guidelines specify the rights, as well as, power distribution of a
company‘s stakeholders with emphasis on three different types of groups, board of directors,
shareholders, and company management. Such practices and guidelines that are implemented are
to ensure the company operates ethically and optimally as possible. (Brink, 2011)
Claessens (2006) states a definition of corporate governance falls into two different categories.
The first category is concerned with a set of corporate behavior, which is measured by
performance, efficiency, and growth. The second category is following an ideal or standard
regulatory practice, which is derived from the legal system and financial market regulations. A
major and commonly referred to definition of corporate governance within literature and
commonly recognized codes for corporate governance is that it‘s a system by which firms are
directed and controlled (Demirag, 1998; Karagiorgos et al., 2010; The Cadbury Report, 1992;
OECD, 2004).
There is an uncertainty factor from shareholders regarding board of directors‘ decisions, and
whether the management and judgment of the directors is aligned with the interest of the
shareholders. Such uncertainty exists because shareholders are not always aware of the thought
process and decision making of the board of directors, which creates a between both parties. To
solve this gap, the corporate governance mechanism, as stated by Becht, Bolton, Roell (2003),
secures the rights of shareholders by it determined governmental rules and regulations. Hence,
corporate governance represents the bridge that fills the relationship gap between shareholders
and the board of directors (Emile et al., 2014).
The importance corporate Governance has been cited to have an impact on a firm‘s performance
and valuation, as stated by Becht, Bolton, Roell (2003), which is considered to greatly affect
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shareholders interest within the firm. Since one of the tasks for the board of directors is to secure
the rights of the stockholders within the corporation, it is highly significant to investigate the
characteristics of the board and its effects on corporate performance.
Research and literature review suggests that poor quality of corporate governance leads to poor
performance among corporate entities (O'Regan et al., 2004). Interestingly, there is relatively
little paid attention to the developments in the Pan-Arab region, especially after the uprising of
the Arab Spring that has swept different parts of the region. Also, there is relatively little or
limited empirical evidence known about Pan-Arab firms involvement in business and finance
along with the issues related to board effectiveness, considering the region contains rich,
uprising, and emerging markets. Also, the effectiveness of corporate governance variables
present within Pan-Arab firm is questionable with little literature review for reference that only
covers firms from single countries or limited number of grouped countries instead of covering
the entire Arab region.
The implementation of corporate governance frameworks in the Middle East has been growing
and undergone a substantial evolution over the past decade. The improvement of policy and law
regulations, execution of corporate governance rules and guidelines and the development of
market regulators in the Middle Eastern region has been tremendous over the years. (Amico,
2014)
Even though the application of corporate governance present within Pan-Arab countries is under
development, corporate bodies must support new initiatives and legislations, as well as, constant
improvement and revision of the corporate governance code throughout the region in order to
enhance firm competitiveness and effectiveness. The real challenge is the development and
application of effective governance practices and mechanisms which will ensure greater
transparency and will further facilitate innovation among business operations within the region
(Baydoun et al, 2012).
Despite constant reforms and demands being made, socio-economic and political challenges has
arisen as a result of the Arab Spring aftermath that has swept the entire region. The Arab Spring
uprisings have blamed weak governance implementation, absence of accountability and policies
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serving certain groups and not serving the general public. The widespread of corruption and
embedded mal-governance has influenced the citizens of the affected countries to undergo
transformation by redefine their social contracts with their governments and rebuild their trust in
their institutions. However, if these challenges are properly addressed, it should lead to even
further corporate governance reform.
In this paper, different corporate governance variables along with financial data of Pan-Arab
firms will be reviewed to measure and analyze the effectiveness of corporate governance and its
significance to the firm‘s performance, and also, comparing the corporate governance variables
five years before the Arab Spring uprising to the five years during/after the uprising. The study
tests this through regression analysis (OLS) adopted by using the statistical package (SPSS) in
order to understand the relationship between the independent variables (board of directors and
ownership structure), controlled variables including macroeconomic variables, and dependent
variables. This includes 225 listed non-financial firms from eleven Pan-Arab countries that were
gathered from the S&P Dow Jones Pan Arab Composite Index.
The corporate governance mechanisms chosen and discussed in this paper are as follows. The
independent corporate governance variables are; board size, board independence, CEO duality,
female directors on board, ownership concentration, director ownership, institutional ownership,
and foreign ownership. The controlled corporate governance variables are; firm size, firm age,
industry type, auditor type, foreign exchange rate (FX), inward and outward foreign direct
investment, gross domestic product (GDP) and a revolution variable accounting for during/after
and before the Arab Spring uprising of the year 2011. The dependent variables or firm
performance is measured by return on assets and return on equity; these ratios are used
extensively in the literature as measures of profits. Also, the debt ratio, which is measured by
long term and short term debt to total assets, is used to capture the leverage of the firm.
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 1 includes a brief introduction for the study, research
question and variables. Chapter 2 explores the origins and different interpreted meanings of
corporate governance, the fundamental theories associated with corporate governance, the
commonly recognized corporate governance codes and guidelines, and a brief summary on
corporate governance in the Middle East specifically in Pan-Arab countries. Chapter 3 reviews
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the existing empirical research on the effect of corporate governance variables on firm
performance, different methodological approaches, and their findings that will lead to the study‘s
hypothesis development. Chapter 4 discusses the methodological approach for the study, the
population and sample selection, the different sources used for the data collection, the definitions
and measurements for the variables used for this study and the research method that will be used.
Chapter 5 reports the findings and analysis of the hypothesis testing for each of the three models
used, as well as reporting the results from Mann-Whitney U Test. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes
and concludes the study, as well as, mentions research limitations, quality of information and
proposed recommendation for future research.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
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2. Literature Review
2.1. History and Definition

The discussion of the history of corporate governance should be initiated by discussing the
background of corporations, which is traced back to the middle ages until the industrial
revolution. Firms in its current form are a product of a semi-governmental form of a kingdom
created for a specific trading purpose. Modern firms in their current state later evolved from a
single individual sponsorship into a financing arrangement controlled by a group of people with
similar interest that devoted huge capital investments in order to feed the firm‘s investment needs
to achieve firm sustainability and expansion. (Adelopo, 2013)
As ownership developments were unfolding, it was important to understand and observe the
firms structure and operation. A study by Berle and Mean‘s (1932) attracted devotion to issues of
governance by suggesting as corporations expand and become bigger, there is a clear separation
between firm owners and their management and there should a form of a bond between both
parties. (Adelopo, 2013)
Studies by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) suggested the possibility of conflicts of
interest between firm management, the insiders who are in control, and investors, the outside
owners which have no direct role over management, which launched discussions on corporate
governance (Adelopo, 2013).
Recently, discussion on corporate governance has been widely used professionally and
academically and has gained popularity due to the corporate collapses as a result of conflicts of
interest, poor ethics and corporate dishonesty and fragile internal controls and risk assessment,
despite corporate governance has no generally accepted or precise definition that could be agreed
upon. The disagreement could be as a result of its capability of many uses and applications
where the term cuts through many disciplines such as management, law, behavioral science and
humanities which are used in both private and business world and relevant to business of
governments. (Razzaee, 2009; Adelopo, 2013)
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The term‘s definition is changed when approached by people with a different discipline and
view. The complexity in capturing an agreeable definition of corporate governance along with its
diversity of its applications can be best explained in the following quotation by Maw et al.
(1994):
―Some commentators take too narrow a view, and say it (Corporate Governance) is the fancy
term for the way in which directors and auditors handle their responsibilities towards
shareholders. Others use the expression as if it were synonymous with shareholder democracy.
Corporate governance is a topic recently conceived, as yet ill-defined, and consequently blurred
at the edges.
Corporate governance as a subject, as an objective, or as a regime to be followed for the good of
shareholders, employees, customers, bankers, and indeed for the reputation and standing of our
nation and its economy.‖ (Maw et al., 1994: Page 1)

Others have attempted to point out a more robust definition for the term. According to Cadbury
(1992), ―Corporate governance is the system by which institutions are directed and controlled.
Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their institutions. The shareholders'
role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an
appropriate governance structure is in place‖.
The OECD (2004) advisory group explains the definition of corporate governance that it ―is the
system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate governance
structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in
the corporation, such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells
out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also
provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining
those objectives and monitoring performance.‖

The Basel Committee (2010) defines corporate governance, specifically for banks and financial
institutions, as ―the manner in which the business and affairs of individual financial institutions
are governed by their boards of directors and senior management.‖
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Furthermore, Karagiorgos et al. (2010) defined corporate governance as ―the total of operations
and controls of the institution or as an overall structured system of principles according to which
an institution operates and is organized, managed and controlled.‖

On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) described corporate governance might deal with
the ways in which suppliers of finance to institutions ensure themselves of getting a return on
their investment. Also, Sternberg (1998) defined corporate governance that it designates means
of certifying that agents and actions of an institution are directed to accomplish the goals
established by the institution‘s shareholders.

A major and commonly referred to definition of corporate governance within literature and
commonly recognized codes for corporate governance is that it‘s a system by which firms are
directed and controlled (Demirag, 1998; Karagiorgos et al., 2010; The Cadbury Report, 1992;
OECD, 2004).

2.2. Corporate Governance Theories

There has been an evolution of theories concerning corporate governance mechanisms that
companies enforce into their own corporate structure. The fundamental theories discussed within
corporate governance were initiated with the agency theory, which later evolved into the
stewardship theory and stakeholder theory and later the resource dependency theory.
The theories that will be discussed reports the cause and its effect on corporate governance
variables, such as the structure of board members and its committees along with their roles
within the corporation, in addition to, their social relationships rather than their regulatory
frameworks. Therefore, it is suggested that a combination of several theories is best to describe
an effective governance practice rather than hypothesizing corporate governance based on a
singular or unified theory. (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009)
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Agency theory
The agency relationship exists when a party, being the principle, hires agents for the company to
act on the principal‘s behalf. However, if both the principle and agent focuses on maximizing
their own utility, there is a chance that the agent might not always act in the principal‘s best
interest (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
The main principal of the agency theory is to resolve conflicts that arise from the separation of
ownership and management over the control of the corporation (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen,
1986; Bhimani, 2008).
The agency theory specifies certain mechanisms which resolve two problems within the agency
relationship which reduces agency loss.


The first issue is the interests of both the principle and the agent are not aligned, which
later, results a conflict. Also, when the principal cannot verify or measure if the agent is
fulfilling the job requirements or even be certain if the agent is exerting maximum effort.



The second issue is when the principal and agent have different preferences towards risk
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Hence, the agency theory is the study of the agency relationship and
the issues that arise from the principal and agent dilemma which results in an agency loss.
However, Bruce et al. (2005) objects to agency theory stating that it wholly ―relies on an
assumption of self-interested agents who seek to maximize personal economic wealth‖.

Agency loss is viewed as the difference between the maximum beneficial outcome possible for
the principal and the consequences of the agent‘s acts. If the interests of an agent are consistent
and aligned with the interests of the principal‘s, as a result, zero agency loss occurs. However,
when the agent‘s interests diverge from the principal‘s interests, a higher agency loss occurs.
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991)
In order to solidify the alignment of interest and decrease the level of managerial opportunism,
an outcome based contract between the principle and agent influences the behavior of the agent
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to be within then interest of the principle. Such a contract can include appropriate incentive
schemes for managers as a financial reward for maximizing shareholder wealth such as profit
sharing or offering the company‘s shares at a reduced price. (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
Moreover, another method the agency theory proposes in order to solve the agency problem is
the agent aligns with principle interest when the principle holds information that verifies the
agent‘s behavior. Information systems are more likely to curb the agent‘s opportunism and
becomes in tune with the principle that now is aware of the agent‘s movement. The role of
efficient capital and labor markets can be used as an information system to control executive
opportunism (Fama, 1980). The role of the board of directors also can be used as an information
mechanism to monitor executive behavior (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Information mechanism is
described such as budgeting systems, reporting procedures or even hiring additional independent
and non-executive employees all for monitoring purposes.
Donaldson and Davis (1991) agree that an effective mechanism to restrain such divergence of
management from shareholder interest is the board of directors by explaining the board provides
a monitoring of managerial actions on behalf of shareholders especially when the board chair is
independent from executive management. It is further explained that when an executive holds a
dual role of CEO and board chair, owner‘s interest is sacrificed as a result of managerial
opportunism and furthers agency loss.
The stewardship theory
On the contrary of the agency theory, the stewardship theory has been introduced as a method of
defining relationships based on other behavioral premises in a sense that it stresses on the role of
top management as being stewards rather than individualists, which integrates their goals as part
of the organization (Donaldson 1990a; Donaldson 1990b; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Hence,
the stewardship theory holds that there is neither integral nor general issue of executive and
upper management motivation.
However, questions arise of how far executives can achieve the virtuous corporate performance
to which they desire (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The key depends solely on the organization
structure which provides clear role expectations and assists executives to formulate plans and
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successfully implement them to achieve superior corporate performance (Donaldson, 1985;
Donaldson and Davis, 1991)
Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) defined the role of a ‗steward‘ where ―a steward
protects and maximizes shareholders wealth through firm performance, because by so doing, the
steward‘s utility functions are maximized‖. The main assumption underlying the stewardship
theory is the behaviors of the agents are aligned with the interests of the principals, where the
economic benefits for the principal within the stewardship theory results lower transaction costs,
which is associated with the lower need for economic incentives and monitoring. (Pastoriza and
Ariño, 2008).
The stewardship theory places greater significance on goals in conjunction with the parties
involved in corporate governance than on the agent‘s own interest (Van Slyke, 2006). Stewards
are motivated by intrinsic rewards, such as mutuality and goal alignment, rather than solely on
extrinsic rewards. The steward, as opposed to the agent, places greater value on collective and
mutual goals rather than individual goals; the steward recognizes the success of the company as
if it is his or her own achievement. Thus, the major difference between both the agency theory
and the stewardship theory is on the nature of motivation; the agency theory places more
emphasis on extrinsic motivation, while on the other hand, the stewardship theory is focused on
intrinsic rewards that are not easily quantifiable. (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997)
The stakeholder theory
The corporation has earned a role greater than business tractions, however, has become a method
of organizing economic life (Freeman, 2001). Within that same sense, managers have a duty not
only towards stockholders, but also must keep a fiduciary relationship among stakeholders.
As stated by Freeman (1984), stakeholders can be defined ―any group or individual who is
affected by or can affect the achievement of an organization‘s objectives‖ whereas the
stakeholder theory was created for the purpose to plan methods to manage the relationships of
these groups and individuals in a strategic manner.
The successful strategies are those that assimilate and take consideration the interests of all
stakeholders rather than maximizing the position of a single group (Freeman, 2001). Arguably,
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Freeman‘s (1984) definition of stakeholders is considered to be a broad definition as it nearly
includes anyone (Mitchell, et al., 1997). Additionally, Freeman (2010) revisited the definition of
stakeholders to be ―groups or individuals that benefit or harmed, and whose rights are violated or
respected by organization operations‖.
During the year 1963, an internal memo generated by the Stanford Research Institute (now
known as SRI international) has argued that in order to achieve long term success, managers
needed to develop objectives that stakeholders will support which required exploring the
concerns and relationships of groups such as employees, customers, suppliers, lenders and
society in general. Such theories had minor impact at the time on management theories.
However, during the 1980‘s, the stakeholder approach returned as a framework for strategic
management when it was mentioned and happened to be highly related to concepts such as
corporate planning, systems theory, corporate social responsibility and organizational theory.
(Freeman, 2001)
Donaldson and Preston (1995) argued that the stakeholder theory focuses on managerial decision
making and interests of all stakeholders, in such all stakeholders have intrinsic value where no
sets of interests of a particular group dominates the others. On the other hand, Clarkson (1995)
defines stakeholders as ―constituencies‖ that are affected by a corporation‘s operation, regardless
of whether the stakeholders are linked through explicit (direct) or implicit (indirect) contracts.
Hence, it is concluded that stakeholder theory is less of a formal unified theory and more of a
broad research tradition that incorporates different inter-related concepts from organizational
science to social responsibility (Abdullah and Valentine, 2009).
Resource dependency theory
On the contrary of the stakeholder theory, which focuses on relationships with many groups for
individual benefits, the resource dependency theory focuses on the role of board of directors in
delivering access to resources that is needed by the corporation (Abdullah and Valentine, 2009).
The resource dependency theory argues that the role of directors serves in connecting with the
external environment in order to secure essential resources, navigate external contingencies, and
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provide insights from diverse perspectives (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Canella and
Paetzold, 2000).
Moreover, some directors themselves are recognized as providers of resources that are needed
for an organization, which further proves that the board of directors is considered to be an
important mechanism that links an organization with the external environment (Hambrick et al.,
2015).
The shareholder theory
Originally proposed by Milton Friedman, the shareholder theory proclaims that shareholders
advance capital to a company and its managers, where such capital is supposed to be spent on
corporate funds only that are authorized and approved by the shareholders (Smith, 2003). The
shareholder theory makes the only corporate responsibility for a firm is to focus on maximizing
profits, which is considered to be the shareholders main interest. (Lee, 2008)
Hence, the ultimate goal for managers is to use the capital for organizations with a main purpose
to increase the returns of the firm, which in response increases the return of the shareholders.
(Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003)
2.3. Corporate Governance Codes and Guidelines

Commonly recognized codes and reports are heavily referenced that were published for the sole
purpose of promoting and guiding to good corporate governance practices. The Cadbury Report
(1992), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles of
Corporate Governance (1999 and 2004), and the Sarbanes-Oxley Law (2002) are among the
most commonly referred to guidelines when referencing the general principles of good
governance. (Anca, 2012)
The reason behind choosing such guidelines is to understand the important variables in order to
within research method, variables and hypothesis.
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The Cadbury report
On May 1991, the London Stock Exchange set up a committee under the leadership of Sir Arian
Cadbury. The committee was set up during the heightening of unexpected failures of major
firms, for the main purpose to help raise the standards of corporate governance and restore the
level of confidence in financial reporting. The committee drafted the Cadbury report, which sets
out the methods of governance needed to achieve a balance between the essential powers of the
Board of Directors and their proper accountability. (Cadbury report, 1992).
Some of the important codes mentioned within the Cadbury report are:
Board of directors, chairman, and CEO
A clear accepted division of responsibilities among the chairman and chief executive of the
company to ensure the balance of power and separation of authority within the firm. When the
chair is also the chief executive, the board should increase the independent element to avoid
power concentration. Adding a senior non-executive director or a deputy chairman to the board
is recommended when there is a chairman and chief executive duality. (Cadbury report, 1992)
Executive directors
Each and every publicly traded company should be headed by an effective board which can lead
and control the business .Board effectiveness includes all board members to work under a
chairman in order to provide leadership and regulation which are both effective governance
demands. (Cadbury report, 1992)
The board should not only include a combination of executive directors, but also a number of
outside non-executive directors, who can bring a broader and a more independent view to the
company‘s operations. (Cadbury report, 1992)
Each executive director should not exceed the duration of three years on the board. There should
be full disclosure on the directors and chairman salary and performance pay. A remuneration
committee should be set up and consist of non-executive directors that recommends the pay of
executive directors. (Cadbury report, 1992)
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All directors are equally responsible for the board‘s actions and decisions. Particular directors
may have certain responsibilities for which they are responsible to the board. (Cadbury report,
1992)
Non-executive
The board should include a sufficient number of non-executive directors for their views to carry
significant contribution and weight in the board‘s decisions in order to maintain the standards of
corporate governance. Non-executive directors have two important contributions to make to the
governance process because of their independence from executive responsibility. (Cadbury
report, 1992)
 The first is in reviewing the performance of the board and of the executive where they
address this aspect of their responsibilities carefully and should ensure that the chairman
is aware of their views. (Cadbury report, 1992)
 The second is in taking the lead where potential conflicts of interest arise. Non-executive
director‘s interests are less directly affected by executive management interest, where
they should also bring an independent judgment to bear on issues of strategy,
performance, resources, including key appointments, and standards of conduct. (Cadbury
report, 1992)
It is recommended that the composition of sub-committees of the board requires a minimum of
three non-executive directors, one of whom may be the chairman of the company provided he or
she is not also its executive head. Moreover, the majority of the non-executive directors should
be independent. Independent as in the directors should be independent from management and
free from any business or other relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of
their independent judgment. (Cadbury report, 1992)
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The Sarbanes-Oxley law (SOX) was created by U.S. government authorities for the sole purpose
to regulate several principles of good governance which includes many of the principles
mentioned and supported in the Cadbury and OECD reports. The SOX act led a major change in
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accounting and financial reporting which caused an increase control on corporate governance,
which protects investor‘s investment and prevents further loss of confidence in the U.S. stock
market.
Some of the major points mentioned within the SOX act are:
Public company accounting oversight board
The establishment of a ‗Public Company Accounting Oversight Board‘ consisting of five
members where the term of service of each board member shall not exceed five years until a
successor is chosen and appointed. The establishment is needed in order to oversee the audit of
publicly traded companies as a result to protect the interests of investors and public interest while
preparing accurate and independent audit reports. (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002)
Auditor independence
The establishment of standards for the independence of external auditors such as restrictions for
audit firms from bookings, consulting, and brokerage form the same client. Accounting policies
and practices should be reported under the generally accepted accounting principles. Financial
statements should be accurate and truthful and free of misleading information and must disclose
all information available along with future changes if any backing it with an internal control
report which assures the accuracy of financial reports and disclosures. (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
2002)
Frequent audit partner rotation should occur every five fiscal years after the approval of the audit
committee. The mandatory rotation of registered public accounting firms may be the auditor of
record for a particular issuer no later than one year. (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002)
Corporate responsibility
The audit committee is directly responsible for the oversight of the work of any registered public
accounting firm for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or related work, and each
such registered public accounting firm shall report directly to the audit committee. A member of
an audit committee of an issuer may not be on the board of directors, or any other board
committee. (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002)
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The chief executive officer along with the chief financial officer, or any other person performing
with similar functions, must certify each annual report filed has been reviewed and fairly
presented to the best of their knowledge and that it is free of any misleading or untruthful
statements. (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002)
The OECD report
The OECD Principles were developed in 1999 and last updated in 2004 and reviewed under the
support of the OECD Corporate Governance Committee with all G20 countries invited to
participate. The principles are intended to assist policy makers evaluate and improve the
regulatory and institutional framework for corporate governance, with a view of supporting
financial stability, economic efficiency and constant sustainable growth.
Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework
A framework of corporate governance should be developed with a broad-view to its impact on
overall economic and market performance and integrity. The division of responsibilities among
different parties should be clearly stated and designed to properly serve the public and company
interest. (OECD, 2004)
The rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and key ownership functions
The framework of CG should protect shareholders rights and ensure equal treatment of all
shareholders regardless of what class they fall under. Shareholder should participate in key
corporate governance decisions, such as the nomination and election of board of directors.
Conflicts of interest among the board members should be notified and addressed. (OECD, 2004)
The role of stakeholders in corporate governance
The framework of corporate governance should recognize the rights of stakeholders established
by the federal law or through mutual agreements and encourage cooperation between
corporations in creating prosperity, jobs, and financial stability. (OECD, 2004)
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Disclosure and transparency
The framework of corporate governance should ensure accurate and full disclosure is made on all
firm matters, such as financial, performance, ownership, and governance, in a timely matter. An
independent annual audit should be conducted by a competent and un-biased auditor in
accordance of generally accepted auditing standards to provide external assurance to the board
and shareholders that the firm‘s financial statements are fairly represented. (OECD, 2004)
The responsibilities of the board
The framework of corporate governance should ensure strategic and objective guidance of the
firm, effective monitoring of management under the board‘s supervision, and the board‘s
responsibility towards the firm and its shareholders. The board is primarily responsible for
monitoring managerial performance, reviewing governance and corporate policies and
procedures, addressing conflicts of interest, and balancing challenging corporate demands. In
order to fulfill their responsibilities, the board must execute under an independent judgment that
is within the company‘s and shareholders interest. (OECD, 2004)
2.4. Corporate Governance in the Middle East

The Middle East and North Africa region is considered to be one of the emerging markets in
which corporate governance model has been seen as a new thought. Mostly family owned
companies and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) dominate the corporate scene and the
private sector respectively within the region.
Corporate governance is considered to play a key role in shaping a healthy business
environment. Corporate governance values such as transparency, responsibility and fairness are
considered significant starting points towards creating improved business practices. Good
corporate governance influences better and transparent relationships among corporations‘ board
of directors, shareholders, executives and other stakeholders. A stronger relationship among the
parties is also influenced by the legal and regulatory framework as a result of implementing
business ethics, governance codes and raising social and environmental awareness.
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However, despite being a new concept within the region, corporate governance has been
spreading through the Middle Eastern and North African countries and has been making
significant in the past decade. Practitioners ranging from public and private sector, capital
markets, banks and other financial institutions have accepted the need to address and
implementation of corporate governance reform. Such needs are required in order to create a
competitive market system and the development of law-based democracy society.
Despite constant reforms and demands being made, socio-economic and political challenges has
arisen as a result of the Arab Spring aftermath that has swept the entire region. The Arab Spring
uprisings have blamed weak governance implementation, absence of accountability and policies
serving certain groups and not serving the general public. The widespread of corruption and
embedded mal-governance has influenced the citizens of the affected countries to undergo
transformation by redefine their social contracts with their governments and rebuild their trust in
their institutions. However, if these challenges are properly addressed, it should lead to even
further corporate governance reform.
The Middle Eastern and North African region has been determined and motivated to improve
governance standards. Governance codes for listed companies have mostly been issued by
MENA countries. However, issues arise regarding the implementation of such codes, especially
in the areas of transparency and disclosure and board practices in particular. With no doubt,
much of the weight of ensuring proper implementation falls on the different regulators present
within the region. Institutional investors also can have a larger and active role in governance
implementation and examine the governance arrangements of companies. (Nadal, 2013)
Although most listed companies in the MENA countries implement governance codes, the focus
and implementation of corporate governance on listed companies should also be applied towards
family owned companies, small and medium sized enterprises and state owned enterprises in
order to facilitate private sector growth. (Nadal, 2013)
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHOSIS DEVELOPMENT
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3. Hypotheses Development
3.1 Board Structure
Board Size
A study by Eisenberg et al.(1998) shows a negative correlation between small and medium sized
firms profitability, when measured by ROA, and board size. It is further stated that the ideal
board size differs depending on firm size. In closely held firms, communication and management
coordination problems could arise, which would imply that owners choose less than the highest
standard board structure. Hence, board size does reflect the composition of the board that
matches their own capabilities, where its effects may have different roots in small closely held
firms than in larger and more diverse firms.
Larger boards can consist of more outsiders who may assist in more careful decision making
policies in firms, since the reputation cost if the firm fails is likely to be high in comparison with
their private benefit if a project turns out to be profitable. Board size affects investor decisions on
the long run, where owners with most of their wealth invested in one particular firm might prefer
a board composition associated with careful strategic decision-making; while more diversified
investors might choose board structures associated with riskier investment decisions policies.
(Eisenberg et al., 1998)
Kiel and Nicholson (2003) examined the relationships between board size and firm performance
in publicly traded large companies. It is concluded that board size is positively correlated with
firm value.
Dalton et al.(1999) found that there is a positive systematic relationship in a meta-analysis of
board size and firm performance.
On the other hand, Yermack (1996) states that there is an inverse relationship between board size
and firm value, and that financial ratios related to profitability and operating efficiency appear to
decline as board size grows.

30

This leads to the first research hypothesis:
H1: There is a significant relationship between board size and firm performance
Board Independence
Rashid et al. (2010) realized the effects of board composition on company performance by
developing two hypotheses to examine the relationship among composition of board
memberships including independent directors and firm performance. Their results reveal that
independent directors do not add value to the firm‘s economic performance, but they also
mention independent directors might add benefits for greater transparency.
Luan and Tang (2007) concluded that independent director appointments do have a significantly
positive impact on a firm‘s performance, but questions whether the change in governance
structure could result in performance implications.
However, Yermack (1996) reports that ﬁrms with more outside directors displays lower
performance when using Tobin‘s Q as a measurement. Similarly, Kiel and Nicholson (2003)
found a negative relationship between ﬁrm performance and the proportion of outside directors.
This prompts the second research hypothesis:
H2: There is a significant relationship between board independence and firm performance
Duality Separation
The primary responsibility of a CEO is the implementation of strategic decisions and initiation of
decision management. On the hand, the responsibility of the board of directors is to control,
endorse and monitor such decisions pursued by the CEO (Sheikh & Wang, 2012).
Fama and Jensen (1983) explain that the survival of organizations is characterized by the
separation of ownership and control. Fama and Jensen clarifies that managerial decisions,
without the implementation of control procedures, are more likely to make decisions that deviate
from the interest of the firm. It is later explained that the implementation of an effective system
for control procedures implies that the control of decisions, the entity or group responsible for

31

monitoring and ratification functions, is separated from the management decisions, which is
responsible for the implementation and risk bearing functions. Such implementation is assists to
regulate these agency problems by restricting and limiting the authority of managers and
executives.
Other supporting literature states that combining the roles of CEO and board chairman will give
more power over board selection which allows greater influence and control over decision
making (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Adams, Heitor Almeida,
and Ferreira, 2005).
Moreover, CEO duality restricts information dissemination towards board members which leads
to the increase of agency costs of managerial decision making, hence, diminishing board
effectiveness in promoting the corporations economic value (Dahya and McConnell, 2005;
Nelson, 2005; Raheja, 2005). Similarly, Goyal and Park (2002) finds that the CEO turnover to
corporate performance is lower when both titles are unified.
On the other hand, CEO duality can be seen as a positive indicator leading to better corporate
performance, because it is seen that the corporation has a clear leadership and vision that can
properly direct the company. This is supported by the stewardship theory and the resource
dependency theory, which states unifying the command by having roles of CEO and chairman
held by the same person will facilitate effective actions that are taken by the CEO, which will
lead to better firm performance and lead to better beneficial consequences on shareholder
returns.
The empirical evidence is that the ROE returns to shareholders are improved by combining the
role of the CEO and chairman positions. Thus, the results fail to support agency theory and lean
towards supporting the stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Gaur et al. (2015)
argued that presence of directors and CEO duality leads to unification of control and command,
and consequently higher performance. Moreover, Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) states that directors
with more freedom of decision making are more likely to implement strategic decisions that will
overcome organizational indolence, which suggests combining CEO and board of directors
chairman will lease to less restrictions and pressures on the CEO during strategy implementation.
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There is another view on CEO duality by ElSayed (2007), where it has no impact on corporate
performance. Elsayed states, however, the impact of CEO duality on corporate performance is
found to vary across different industries, a result that supports both agency theory and
stewardship theory. In addition, when firms are categorized according to their financial
performance, CEO duality attracts a positive and significant coefficient only when corporate
performance is low.
From a debt and leverage perspective, Abore (2007) finds that there is a positive significant
relationship between CEO duality and firm leverage. Similarly, Bokpin and Arko (2009) states
that there is positive relationship, however insignificant, between CEO duality and firm financial
leverage suggesting that CEO‘s leans towards financing by debt rather than financing by equity
when it comes to firm operation strategy.
This prompts the third research hypothesis:
H3: There is a significant relationship between CEO duality and firm performance
Diversity
A considerable amount of ambition towards increased gender diversity on boards will have
significant "added value" effects and positive economic consequences. (Beaufort and Summers,
2014). A study by Francoeur et al.(2008) stated that firms operating in complex environments
that have a high percentage of women do witness positive returns. On the other hand, they state,
having more women on corporate boards or on both corporate boards and top management does
not seem to generate significant excess returns.
Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) argued that the gender composition of a board can affect the
quality of the monitoring role on the board and hence affects the financial performance of the
firm. Economic arguments, on the other hand, are based on the proposition that firms which fail
to select the most suitable candidates for the board of directors damage the firm‘s financial
performance. Their findings demonstrate that the presence of women in particular on the board
of directors does not affect firm value. However, they find that the diversity in general of the
board has a positive impact on firm value.
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Adams and Ferreira (2009) found that diversity has a positive impact on performance in firms
that have weak board governance. In firms with strong governance, however, enforcing gender
proportions in the board could eventually decrease shareholder value. A possible explanation is
that greater gender diversity could lead to over monitoring within such firms.
A different view has been established after exploring the strengths and limitations of various
methodologies and survey findings, Rhode and Packel (2014) concludes that the relationship
between diversity and financial performance has not been convincingly established. This leads us
to the following hypothesis.
This leads to the forth research hypothesis:
H4: There is a significant relationship between board diversity and firm performance

3.2 Ownership Structure
Ownership structure is considered to be a key variable in corporate governance studies as it
determines who handles the decision making power within a corporation (Zattoni, 2011).
Ownership Concentration
Omran et al. (2008) concluded that ownership concentration is a response to poor legal
protection of investors, and has no significant effect on firms‘ performance. Similarly, findings
by Warrad et al. (2013) concluded that non-managerial ownership concentrations on all levels do
not have a statistical significant effect on firm performance either it is measured by ROA, ROE,
or Tobin‘s Q.
On the other hand, Wang et al. (2015) reports that ownership concentration has a negative
relation with firm performance across different countries as a result of controlling shareholder
agency problems or negative impacts on other corporate governance mechanisms arising from
concentrated ownership.
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Gaur et al. (2015) argued that a lack of ownership concentration leads to agency problems,
resulting in poor performance. However, the positive effect of board independence on firm
performance is reduced in firms that have a higher ownership concentration. This leads us to the
following hypothesis.
This leads to the fifth research hypothesis:
H5: There is a significant relationship between ownership concentration and firm
performance
Director Ownership

Different proxies for firm performance, accounting and market measures, produce different
relationships with director ownership concentration. Bolbol et al. (2004) states that director
ownership concentration on all levels does not have a statistical significant effect on neither
ROA nor ROE, but has statistical significance on Tobin‘s Q. However, this result seems to
depend more on reputation effects and lower agency costs than on market fundamentals affecting
the firms‘ actual performance. Hence, future improvements in corporate governance practices are
better evaluated through its effect on performance measures rather than market measures
(Warrad et al., 2013).
Drakos and Bekiris (2010) conducted an analysis for the same topic and found that when director
ownership is treated as endogenous, a positive impact can be found on corporate value. Kamran
and Shah (2014) states that director ownership has a positive impact on 372 firms from Pakistan
which supports the understanding that mangers who are deeply-rooted in a firm are more
influential in terms of corporate decisions that are skewed within their own interest.
On the other hand, after controlling for investment intensity, leverage, growth and size, Mandaci
and Gumu (2010) found that ownership concentration has a significantly positive effect on both
firm value and profitability, while director ownership has a significantly negative effect on firm
value.
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Other evidence also indicates that the patterns of the relation between managerial ownership and
firm performance, in the sense that the inflection points for the impact of managerial ownership
turning from positive to negative, are markedly different across ownership managements (Chen,
2006).
From a debt and leverage perspective, there are empirical findings that conclude director
ownership is positively related to debt ratio of firms, due to managers‘ financial alignment with
outside shareholders which would pursue a levered capital structure which leads to an increase in
firm value (Mehran, 1992; Berger et al., 1997). Moreover, Kim and Sorensen (1986) concluded
that that firms with greater director ownership is more likely to have higher debt ratios compared
to firms with minor director ownership.
However, the excessive use of debt can cause bankruptcy risk and increase the non-diversifiable
risk of bankruptcy to managers themselves. (Bathala et al., 1994)
This prompts the sixth research hypothesis:
H6: There is a significant relationship between director ownership and firm performance
Institutional Ownership

Alshammari (2015) reports that the effect of institutional owners is expected to positively
moderate the relationship between common reporting standard (CSR) activities and firm
performance.
Literature reviews on institutional ownership states that it enhances institution‘s performance
(Hartzell and Starks, 2003), and that it improves institutions performance (Maury, 2006), and
that there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and institution performance
(Smith, 1996; Guercio and Hawkins, 1999).
Elyasiani and Jia (2010) similarly found that there is a positive relationship between firm
performance and institutional ownership stability. This relationship is robust to the employment
of ownership turnover measures used in literature and consistent with the view that stable
institutional shareholders play an important role in monitoring. Furthermore, better firm

36

performance is observed when the long term institutional investors, particularly of foreign
institutions, are higher (Hsu and Wang, 2014). A study by Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) also
shows that the size of outside institutional stockholdings has a significant effect on the firm's
capital structure.
In a different twist, evidence suggests an endogeneity problem between firm performance and
institutional ownership. However, the scale of the problem differs with respect to the
concentration of ownership measure used. Results show that a more equal distribution of the
voting power among the largest institutional stakeholder may result positive effects on firm
performance. Consistent with the ownership structure in Finland, it has been found that a simple
ownership concentration index does not influence firm performance (Bhattacharya et al., 2009).
From a debt and leverage perspective, Bathala et al., (1994) found that institutional ownership is
negatively related to the level of debt. Once institutional ownership and monitoring within firms
increases, firms may find it ideal to employ minor levels of debt and managerial ownership in
order to control for agency conflicts. (Bathala et al., 1994)
This leads to the seventh hypothesis:
H7: There is a significant relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance
Foreign Ownership

A study by Azzam et al. (2013) examined the effects of foreign ownership on debt, using the
debt ratio, and company profitability, using ROE and ROA. The end-results indicated that
foreign ownership has a significant and positive effect on debt, where it increases a company‘s
access to more financing.
The study also indicated that an increase in foreign ownership significantly improves firm
performance using the measurements ROE and ROA, where foreign ownership increases
financial performance up to a level and then declines there-after. A similar finding was also
noted by Hintošová and Kubíková (2016). Similarly, a study by Ben Naceur et al. (2007)
examined a sample of 95 firms in four countries which included three Arab countries,

37

specifically Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and found a positive impact of foreign ownership on
profit.
Furthermore, studies regarding foreign ownership on firm performance for single counties show
a positive effect in Belgium (Goethals and Ooghe, 1997), United Kingdom (Alan and Steve,
2005), Egypt (Omran, 2009; Azzam et al. 2013) and Turkey (Gurbuz and Aybars, 2010).
However, a study by Omran et al. (2008) sampled 304 companies from four Arab countries,
Egypt, Jordan, Oman and Tunisia, and found no significance of foreign investing on firm
performance. Yet another study by Omran (2009) later examined fifty two companies all present
within Egypt, the study found that foreign ownership has a positive impact on firm performance.
On the other hand, some studies revealed that foreign ownership has a negative on firm
performance (Sulong & Nor, 2008; Khamis et al. 2015) suggesting the reason is due to the
reduced amount of information between the foreign owners and management (Khamis et al.
2015).
This prompts the eighth research hypothesis:
H8: There is a significant relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance
3.3 Control Variables
Firm Size

Large sized firms have higher profitability and performance measures than small or medium
sized firms. This could be the result of favorable advantages seized by monopoly power and not
advantages gained through efficiency (Warrad et al., 2013). The results of a research by
Nurcahyo et al. (2013) demonstrations that implementation of good corporate governance (GCG)
can affect directly on corporate performance as measured by economic value added (EVA) as
well as indirectly through firm size. Also, Azzam et al. (2013) shows that company size has a
positive effect on ROE and ROA, where a company with a relatively larger size is comparatively
more profitable than a company that is smaller in size.
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On the other hand, Rashid et al. (2010) found that there is a negative relationship between
company size as measured by assets and revenue and performance measurement of Tobin‘s Q,
which is considered a market-value measurement of firm performance. Also, there are some very
distinct relationships between company size and board composition.
Firm size can impact large firms to experience issues of coordination and organization which
may negatively influence performance (Williamson, 1967; Rashid et al. 2010). Williamson
(1967) suggests that the increase in firm size may allow management to encounter control loss
over the firm. Hence, the firm‘s management is considered to be a limitation to firm size, where
if control loss occurs within the managerial hierarchy, this can greatly affect firm performance
negatively. Williamson (1967) also explains that managerial experience is positively related to
firm size. Thus, non-experienced or unqualified management could negatively affect the growth
of a firm, which leads to lower or inefficient firm performance.
A study on firms in Pakistan by Sheikh & Wang (2012) finds that firm size is positively related
to the debt ratio. This is supported by the static trade‐off model, a theory which allows a firm to
understand its ability to finance with a certain balance between debt and equity, which suggests
that large firms should borrow more due to their ability to diversify the risk and benefit from the
tax shields on interest payments.
Firm Age
Loderer & Waelchli (2010) states that firm performance, specifically ROA, declines as firm age
increases over time. However, even though this hypothesis is supported by the deterioration of
corporate governance variables as well as having larger boards, this finding does not explain the
full aging effect, where it seems to be relatively related to problems in ideas that should be
implemented keeping the firm aligned with current industry standard practices.
In terms of debt and leverage, a study by Pfaffermayr et al. (2013) found that firm age has a
negative impact on debt ratios which indicate that older firms depends less on debt compared to
younger firms. Similarly, Berger and Udell (1998) and Reid (2003) illustrated that a firm's debt
ratio decreases when they pass their start-up phase period. Moreover, Coad et al. (2013) stated
that ageing firms experience lower debt ratios.
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Industry Type
According to the signalling theory, companies within the same industry incline to adopt the same
level of disclosure. When a firm within an industry tends not to follow the same disclosure
practices as others within the same industry, then it may be interpreted as a signal that the firm is
withholding negative vital information that might greatly affect investors‘ decisions (Craven and
Marston, 1999).
The difference in disclosure practices among firms present within different industries might be
due to the fact each industry has different costs of disclosure and some firms may be more
advanced in terms of technology than other firms (Ismail, 2002).
Audit Type
Audit firms audit or examine an organization‘s financial statements and express it opinion on the
validity of such statements when being published. Hence, audited financial statements by audit
firms should achieve a level of reliability when reviewing financial statements and presenting an
honest opinion which the organizations‘ principles, shareholders and other stakeholder can rely
on in order to make investment decisions. (Porter et al., 2008; Collin et al., 2013)
Audit practice developments are considered to be more influenced by Big Four firms, which are
the largest four auditing firms worldwide, rather than influenced by smaller local auditing firms.
Hence, a Big Four firm could affect a firm‘s performance positively by leading the firm to
implement proper routines and information systems. (Porter et al., 2008; Mohamed et al., 2013)
In a different twist, Beisland et al. (2015) published a study that revealed the existence of internal
auditors is related to stricter governance, whereas ‗Big Four‘ auditors are generally unrelated to
corporate governance mechanisms. In situations which a significant relationship is present
between audit quality and corporate governance does exist, the relationship is always positive.
Macroeconomic Country Variables
Increased economic and financial integration and macroeconomic fluctuations require that
corporate managers pay more attention than in the past to the link between the "noise" that these
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fluctuations represent and the company's future and past performance to obtain a much clearer
picture of the company's core competitiveness and long term sustainability.
The macroeconomic environment set can be viewed in different variables, such as exchange
rates, inflation rates, and political risk premiums. (Oxelheim, 2003)
Kenworthy (2005) stated that the most common measures of macroeconomic performance are
economic growth and inflation, where economic growth can be measured in various ways, like
gross domestic product and foreign direct investment.
Bonomo et al. (2003) states that firms can see their financial condition deteriorate if a firm has
foreign denominated debt and the real exchange rate of the country that the firm is based in
depreciates. Also, financial condition of a firm could deteriorate if firms have significant shortterm debt or long-term debt contracted at floating rates instead of fixed rates, which will result in
higher rates later on.
Revolution
Ghosh (2015) states that the effect of the Arab Spring is considered to be asymmetric, with little
or no effects on certain countries, and from moderate to major effects in several countries.
However, Mousavi & Ouenniche (2014) states that the MENA region is considered to be the
most critical areas in the world to the degree that the political conflicts of the Arab Spring
uprising that occurred within the region had an impact not only on the financial markets within
the area, but also on global financial markets as well.

An area that has not been sufficiently and effectively explored has been the impact of the Arab
Spring uprising on corporate governance and firm performance within the region.
Ghosh (2015) explored MENA banks located in twelve countries during 2000-2012 and found
that the impact of the Arab Spring uprising led to a reduction in bank profitability and increase in
bank risk. A dummy variable is used to account for the years before the Arab Spring uprising
(2006-2010) and after the Arab Spring uprising (2011-2015) in order to test for the significance
on firm performance.
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4. Methodology
4.1.1 Population and Sample Selection

For the purpose of carrying out the research and collecting the data, this study‘s sample
comprises firms listed on the S&P Pan Arab Composite Index which includes the largest
companies within the Arab countries in terms of market capitalization in USD. The population of
the study consists of firms that are publicly listed in the stock exchanges. All financial firms,
including banks, are excluded from the population sample, whereas such firms are considered to
be a regulated industry and are highly likely to have fundamentally different cash flow and
accrual processes. The sample comprises the top 225 companies in stock exchanges of 11
countries after excluding financial companies.
Table (1) - Sample Distribution by Sectors1

GICS Sector Name
Consumer Discretionary (25)
Consumer Staples (30)
Energy (10)
Health Care (35)
Industrials (20)
Information Technology (45)
Materials (15)
Telecommunication Services (50)
Utilities (55)
Total

1

Frequency
29
27
14
9
52
1
66
18
9
225

%
12.89%
12.00%
6.22%
4.00%
23.11%
0.44%
29.33%
8.00%
4.00%
100%

Table (1) shows classification of the sample per the Global Industry Classification Standard
(GICS) which is an industry classification by industry group and sector based on business
activity of each firm. The GICS is developed by MSCI, a US based firm that provides investment
analysis tools and Standard & Poor's (S&P) for use by global financial institutions. The GICS
structure consists of 10 sectors, 24 industry groups, 67 industries and 156 sub-industries.
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Table (2) - Sample Distribution by Country

Country
Bahrain
Egypt
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
Total

Number of
companies
3
15
8
22
1
7
15
15
105
17
17
225

%
1.33%
6.67%
3.56%
9.78%
0.44%
3.11%
6.67%
6.67%
46.67%
7.56%
7.56%
100%

4.1.2 Index Methodology
S&P Pan Arab Composite Index which is designed to reflect the float available to Gulf
Cooperation Council residents, which is considered to be larger than the free float available to
foreigners.
Float factors generally reduce the number of total shares outstanding in the index calculation to
reflect shares available to all investors. In addition to reviewing the amounts held by private,
corporate or government entities, S&P Dow Jones Indices also accounts for any limits or
restrictions on investments by foreign investors or entities. These restrictions may be imposed by
local governments on specific industries or on all public securities. Restrictions may also be
imposed on foreign investors by individual companies, as part of their internal bylaws.
4.1.3 Eligibility Factors Float-Adjustment
A stock‘s weight in an index is determined by its float-adjusted market capitalization. The
methodology to calculate float factors is the same as described in S&P Dow Jones Indices‘ Float
Adjustment Methodology. However, most companies within the GCC region have multiple
guidelines used to determine the relevant float factor for each index. Float factors generally
reduce the number of total shares outstanding in the index calculation to reflect shares available
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to all investors. In addition to reviewing the amounts held by private, corporate or government
entities, S&P Dow Jones Indices also accounts for any limits or restrictions on investments by
foreign investors or entities. These restrictions may be imposed by local governments on specific
industries or on all public securities. Restrictions may also be imposed on foreign investors by
individual companies, as part of their internal bylaws. All GCC markets have different levels of
foreign investment restrictions depending on the investor: one level indicating what is available
for investors residing within the GCC region; and the other for foreign investors. Typically, the
amounts available to GCC residents are larger than those available to foreign investors.
4.2 Data Collection
Companies chosen will be selected from the S&P Pan Arab Composite, which consist of 11
countries and stock markets after excluding financial firms, which are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates.
The data collected is a panel data for ten years from 2006 to 2015. The data is used to compare
the effect of corporate governance on firm performance in the five years before the revolution of
Arab spring to the five years after the revolution. The data was collected from Orbis database,
Reuters Eikon, DataStream, Zawya, and annual reports will also be used to further gather
information. The frequency of the data is annual.
4.3 Measurement of Variables
Within this study, the independent variables used are return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE),
and the debt ratio (DR), where the ratios demonstrated are used extensively in literature reviews as
measurements of profits. The ROA measurement is calculated as the ratio of net income to total
assets or net income divided by total assets, which shows the ability of a firm in generating income
from its assets. The ROE measurement is defined as the ratio of net income to total equity, which
demonstrates the efficiency of using shareholders' equity in generating profits for the firm. The DR
measurement is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets, which describes the leverage of the
firm.
The independent variables used are board size, board independence, CEO duality separation,
diversity, ownership concentration, director ownership, institutional ownership and foreign
ownership. The board size variable measures the total number of board of directors within a firm. The
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board independence variable measures the total number of non-executive directors compared to the
total number of board of directors within a firm. The CEO duality separation variable represents if a
person shares dual position of CEO and chairman within a firm. The diversity variable signifies the
total number of female directors present within a firms‘ board. The ownership concentration denotes
the percentage of all shareholder ownership within the firm who owns shares that add up to 5% or
more, and excludes any other shareholder ownership representing less than 5% ownership.

Furthermore, the director ownership variable is the percentage of all shareholder ownership who are
directors within the firm who owns shares that add up to 5% or more, and excludes any other director
shareholder ownership representing less than 5% ownership. The institutional variable is the
percentage of all shareholder ownership who are institution within the firm who owns shares that add
up to 5% or more, and excludes any other institution shareholder ownership representing less than
5% ownership. The foreign ownership is the percentage of all shareholder ownership who are foreign
within the firm who owns shares that add up to 5% or more, and excludes any other foreign
shareholders ownership representing less than 5% ownership.

The control variables used are firm size, firm age, industry type, auditor type, gross domestic product
(GDP), foreign exchange rate (FX), inward foreign direct investment, outward foreign direct
investment and revolution. The firm age variable signifies the natural log of total assets within a firm.
The firm age variable represents the natural log of the number of years since the firm‘s foundation.
The industry type variable indicates whether the firm is operating under a service or manufacturing
industry.
The GDP, FX, Inward FDI, Outward FDI variables are used for the country that the firm is based in.
The GDP variable is the gross domestic product of the country that the firm is based in. The Foreign
Exchange Rate variable is exchange rate of the country‘s currency that the firm is based in when
compared to USD. Inward FDI signifies investment by a foreign entity in production in the reporting
country, either by buying part or all of a company or by establishing new operations. FDI is longerterm and more permanent that stock market investments, and includes an element of business control.
This is expressed as a share of total investment in the country. On the other hand, the Outward FDI
signifies the investment by an entity from reporting country in production abroad, either by buying
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part or all of a company or establishing new operations. FDI is longer-term and more permanent that
stock market investments, and includes an element of business control.

Finally, the revolution variable indicates either the Arab Spring revolution has occurred during/after
or before the year 2011, which is considered the starting date of the Arab Spring uprising, in order to
examine its effects on firm performance.

Table (3) shows the symbols, definitions and measurements of the aforementioned variables. The
table is divided into three groups, where the first one is related to dependent variables, the second
group concerns with independent variables and the last group is consists of control variables
including the revolution variable as well as the macroeconomics variables.
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Table (3) - Definition and Measurement of Variables
Symbol
Variable Definition
Dependent Variables

Measurement

ROA
Return on Assets
Net Income divided by Total Assets
ROE
Return on Equity
Net Income divided by Total Equity
DR
Debt Ratio
Ratio of Total Debt to Total Assets
Independent Variables (Determinants)
BrdSize
BrdIndp
DualSep

Board Size
Board Independence
CEO Duality Separation

Div

Diversity

OwnCon

Ownership Concentration

DirOwn

Director Ownership

InstOwn

Institutional Ownership

FrngOwn

Foreign Ownership

Number of Board of Directors
Number of Non-Executive Directors divided by Board Size.
If the CEO and Chairman are the same person = 0;
otherwise = 1
Number of female directors that exists on board
Adding up all share ratios of shareholders who have 5% or
more (excluding others)
Adding up all share ratios of shareholders that includes
directors only who have 5% or more (excluding others)
Adding up all share ratios of shareholders that includes
institutions only who have 5% or more (excluding others)
Adding up all share ratios of shareholders (institutions and
individuals) that are foreign only who have 5% or more
(excluding others)

Control Variables
FrmSize

Firm Size

Natural Log of Total Assets

FrmAge
IndType

Firm Age
Industry Type

Natural log of the number of years since the firm‘s foundation
Manufacturing
=
1;
Services
=
2

AudType
GDP

Auditor Type
Gross Domestic Product

If ‗Big 4‘ = 1; otherwise = 0
GDP of the country the firm is based in (USD Standardized)

FX

Foreign exchange rate

Exchange rate of the country the firm is based in to USD

FDII

Inward Foreign
Investment

FDIO

Outward Foreign Direct Outward FDI of the country the firm is based in
Investment

Rev

Revolution

Direct Inward FDI of the country the firm is based in

If year is before Arab Spring = 0; If during or after = 1

2;
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4.4 Research Method
To test the research hypotheses outlined in section 2, regression analysis will be adopted by
using the statistical package (SPSS). The data is then used to compare the corporate governance
variables five years before the Arab Spring uprising to the five years during/after the uprising,
using the Mann-Wittney Test.

The following models will be used as follows:
Model 1: ROA = α + β1 BrdSize + β2 BrdIndp + β3 DualSep +β4 Div+ β5 OwnCon + β6 DirOwn
+ β7 InstOwn + β8 ForgnOwn + β9 FrmSize + β10 FrmAge + β11 IndType + β12 AudType+ β13
Rev+ β14 GDP + β15 FX + β16 FDIO + β17 FDII + ε
Model 2: ROE = α + β1 BrdSize + β2 BrdIndp + β3 Duality +β4 Div+ β5 OwnCon + β6 DirOwn
+ β7 InstOwn + β8 ForgnOwn + β9 FrmSize + β10 FrmAge + β11 IndType + β12 AudType+ β13
Rev+ β14 GDP + β15 FX + β16 FDIO + β17 FDII + ε
Model 3: DR = α + β1 BrdSize + β2 BrdIndp + β3 Duality +β4 Div+ β5 OwnCon + β6 DirOwn +
β7 InstOwn + β8 ForgnOwn + β9 FrmSize + β10 FrmAge + β11 IndType + β12 AudType+ β13 Rev+
β14 GDP + β15 FX + β16 FDIO + β17 FDII + ε

The following hypotheses were developed in order to examine the effect of corporate governance
mechanisms on firm performance:

Table (4): Hypothesis Development
Board Size

H1: There is a significant relationship between
board size and firm performance

Board Independence

H2: There is a significant relationship between
board independence and firm performance

CEO Duality Separation

H3: There is a significant relationship between
CEO duality separation and firm performance

Board Diversity

H4: There is a significant relationship between
board diversity and firm performance
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Ownership Concentration

H5: There is a significant relationship between
ownership concentration and firm performance

Director Ownership

H6: There is a significant relationship between
director ownership and firm performance

Institutional Ownership

H7: There is a significant relationship between
institutional ownership and firm performance

Foreign Ownership

H8: There is a significant relationship between
foreign ownership and firm performance

Firm Size

H9: There is a significant relationship between
firm size and firm performance

Firm Age

H10: There is a significant relationship
between firm age and firm performance

Industry Type

H11: There is a significant relationship
between industry type and firm performance

Audit Type

H12: There is a significant relationship
between audit type and firm performance

Revolution

H13: There is a significant relationship
between revolution and firm performance

Gross Domestic Product

H14: There is a significant relationship
between GDP and firm performance

Foreign Exchange Rate

H15: There is a significant relationship
between FX and firm performance

Outward Foreign Direct Investment

H16: There is a significant relationship
between outward FDI and firm performance

Inward Foreign Direct Investment

H17: There is a significant relationship
between Inward FDI and firm performance
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
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5. Findings and analysis
5.1 Descriptive Analysis and Hypotheses Testing

To study the effect of the corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance, three
econometric models are used in order to test for the seventeen hypotheses previously mentioned.
The regression analysis tool on SPSS is used to test for the effect of the independent variables,
which are board size, board independence, CEO duality separation, diversity, ownership
concentration, director ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership, firm size, firm
age, industry type, auditor type, GDP, Outward FDI, Inward FDI and a Revolution dummy
variable over the dependent variables; Return on assets, Return on equity and Debt ratio.
Model 1 is used in order to test the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on firm
performance using ROA. Model 2 is used to test the effects of corporate governance mechanisms
on firm performance using ROE. Finally, Model 3 is used in order to test the effects of corporate
governance mechanisms on firm performance using Debt ratio. The three models tests for the
hypotheses mentioned from H1 to H17.
Each model is followed by three tables which are coefficients for dependent variable, model
summary for dependent variable and ANOVA for dependent variable.
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Table (5) illustrates the minimum, maximum, mean, dispersion around the mean and the variance
for each of the variables. Table (5) shows the descriptive statistics findings, the central tendency
and dispersion of the indicators.

Std.
Minimum

Maximum

Statistic

Statistic

Mean
Statistic

Std. Error

Deviation

Variance

Statistic

Statistic

ROA

-67.8120-

43.9800

7.749656

.2106361

9.0180793

81.326

ROE

-329.9030-

76.7310

13.032447

.4616504

19.6946789

387.880

.0000

1.4979

.424217

.0053599

.2299131

.053

3

20

8.35

.054

2.208

4.876

.1667

1.0000

.792200

.0051595

.2110372

.045

CEO Duality

0

1

.94

.006

.242

.058

Diversity

0

5

.19

.015

.595

.354

.0000

100.0000

32.602246

.7777860

36.4731069

1330.288

Director Ownership

.0000

100.0000

3.414547

.2107103

9.8719530

97.455

Institutional Ownership

.0000

100.0000

21.755883

.6085482

28.5304645

813.987

Foreign Ownership

.0000

100.0000

4.037387

.2845185

13.3116965

177.201

Firm Size

9.5654

23.1496

13.322025

.0371778

1.5951851

2.545

Firm Age

0

161

25.37

.429

20.055

402.200

Industry Type

1

2

1.38

.010

.485

.235

Auditor Type

0

1

.72

.010

.449

.201

Revolution

0

1

.50

.011

.500

.250

10.873

753.659

350.71274

6.033875

265.970033

70740.058

.0007

3.7552

.833168

.0233193

1.1061296

1.224

FDIO

-.42-

23.54

3.5918

.06393

3.03244

9.196

FDII

-1.46-

92.48

15.1379

.26160

12.40890

153.981

DR
Board Size
Board Independence

Ownership
Concentration

GDP
FX
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5.2.1 Model 1
ROA = α + β1 BrdSize + β2 BrdIndp + β3 Duality +β4 Div+ β5 OwnCon + β6 DirOwn + β7
InstOwn + β8 ForgnOwn + β9 FrmSize + β10 FrmAge + β11 IndType + β12 AudType+ β13 Rev+
β14 GDP + β15 FX + β16 FDIO + β17 FDII + ε
Table (6-1) – Coefficients for dependent variable ROA
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B
(Constant)

Coefficients

Std. Error

15.603

3.121

BrdSize

.616

.123

BrdIndp

-1.517-

DualSep

Beta

t
4.999

.000

.155

4.994

.000

1.338

-.036-

-1.134-

.257

-2.828-

1.121

-.082-

-2.522-

.012

Divers

-.030-

.443

-.002-

-.068-

.946

OwnCon

-.001-

.011

-.005-

-.118-

.906

DirOwn

.041

.026

.047

1.549

.122

InstOwn

.067

.015

.215

4.611

.000

ForgnOwn

-.054-

.021

-.077-

-2.543-

.011

FrmSize

-.926-

.188

-.155-

-4.928-

.000

FrmAge

.022

.013

.047

1.627

.104

IndustryType

-.344-

.537

-.018-

-.640-

.522

AudType

1.405

.631

.068

2.227

.026

FX

.412

.281

.052

1.465

.143

FDIO

.601

.352

.199

1.707

.088

FDII

-.129-

.084

-.171-

-1.539-

.124

Rev

-2.012-

.695

-.109-

-2.895-

.004

.002

.001

.069

1.887

.059

GDP

Table (6-2) – Model Summary for dependent variable ROA

Model
1

Sig.

R

R Square
.288

.083

Adjusted R

Std. Error of the

Square

Estimate
.071

8.7516857
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Table (6-3) – ANOVA for dependent variable ROA
Model
1

Sum of Squares
Regression
Residual
Total

df

Mean Square

8955.365

17

526.786

98956.868

1292

76.592

107912.233

1309

F
6.878

Sig.
.000

Model 1 examines the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance
measured by ROA. The model is highly significant with F-statistics which is equal to 6.878 and
the p – value equals to 0.000 (less than 1%). The independent variables of the same model
accounts for 8.3%variations in the dependent variable as indicated R2.
Board size
Board size appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.000
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROA. This result is consistent with
previous studies demonstrating that there is a significant positive relationship between board size
and financial performance. (Dalton et al., 1999; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).
From a resource dependence theory point of view, a bigger board leads to greater opportunity for
more relationships, associations, contacts and links and which allows access to resources.
(Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Hillman et al. (2000) also
agrees that directors are considered resourceful towards the firm by providing skills and
expertise needed, as well as, access to suppliers, clients and policymakers.
Even though Yermack (1996) states that there is an inverse relationship between board size and
firm value, however, the count of directors adds additional skilled expertise and performance to
the board until it reaches a certain level where the board size outweighs the additional benefits
that is provided. This raises the possibility that there is an inverted relationship between board
size and firm performance. (Jensen, 1993; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Furthermore, Dalton et
al.(1999) states that there is a positive systematic relationship between board size and firm
performance.
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From an agency theory perspective, boards with larger number of members can exercise better
regulation and control on managers than smaller boards. (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and
Preston, 1995; Donaldson, 1999)
Duality Separation
CEO duality separation appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a
0.012 significance level with firm performance when measured by ROA due to the separation of
chairman and CEO responsibilities. Unifying CEO-Chairman positions is common within Pan
Arab countries, especially in family controlled firm, and is considered to be a Gulf phenomenon.
This result is consistent with and supported by the stewardship theory and the resource
dependency theory, which states unifying the command by having roles of CEO and chairman
held by the same person will facilitate effective actions that are taken by the CEO, which will
lead to better firm performance and lead to better beneficial consequences on shareholder
returns. Hence, CEO duality can be seen as a positive indicator leading to better corporate
performance, because it is seen that the corporation has a clear leadership and vision that can
properly direct the company.
Empirical evidence is also consistent with literature review where that the ROE returns to
shareholders are improved by combining the role of the CEO and chairman positions. Thus, the
results fail to support agency theory and lean towards supporting the stewardship theory
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Gaur et al. (2015) argued that presence of directors and CEO
duality leads to unification of control and command, and consequently higher performance.
Moreover, Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) states that directors with more freedom of decision making
are more likely to implement strategic decisions that will overcome organizational indolence,
which suggests combining CEO and board of directors chairman will lease to less restrictions
and pressures on the CEO during strategy implementation.
Institutional ownership
Institutional ownership appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a
0.000 significance level with firm performance when measured by ROA. The result is consistent
with previous studies suggesting that institutional ownership has a positive effect on firm
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performance (Smith, 1996; Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010; Alshammari,
2015) and that it enhances and improves firm performance (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Maury,
2006). This shows that institutional investors contributes by not only providing financial
investment resources, but also providing non-financial resources such as managerial and
industrial expertise and technical resources in which improves the firm‘s profitability and
performance on the long run which limits potential agency problems. (Douma, George, & Kabir,
2006; Chahine & Tohme, 2009; Al-Musalli and Ismail, 2012)
Foreign ownership
Foreign ownership appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.011
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROA. The result is consistent with
previous studies suggesting that some studies revealed that foreign ownership has a negative on
firm performance (Sulong & Nor, 2008; Khamis et al. 2015). The reason is due to the reduced
amount of information between the foreign owners and management (Khamis et al. 2015).
Firm size
Firm size appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.000
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROA. This result is consistent with
firm size can impact large firms to experience issues of coordination and organization which may
negatively influence performance (Williamson, 1967; Rashid et al. 2010).
Williamson (1967) suggests that the increase in firm size may allow management to encounter
control loss over the firm. Hence, the firm‘s management can impact firm performance
negatively when control loss occurs within the managerial hierarchy. Furthermore, Williamson
(1967) also states that managerial experience is positively related to firm size. Thus, nonexperienced or unqualified management could negatively affect the growth of a firm, which
leads to lower or inefficient firm performance.
Additionally, Rashid et al. (2010) indicates a negative relationship between company size, when
measured by assets and revenue, and a market performance measurement of Tobin‘s Q.
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Audit type
Audit type appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.026
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROA when company hires a Big
Four to audit its financials. This result is consistent with Beisland et al. (2015) where it is
revealed that in situations which a significant relationship is present between audit quality and
corporate governance does exist, the relationship is always positive.
Also, the result shows that Big Four firm could affect a firm‘s performance positively by leading
the firm to implement proper routines and information systems. (Porter et al., 2008; Mohamed et
al., 2013)
Revolution
Revolution appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.004
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROA. This shows that the Arab
Spring uprising negatively affected firm performance in terms of ROA measurement.
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5.2.2 Model 2
ROE = α + β1 BrdSize + β2 BrdIndp + β3 Dualit
y +β4 Div+ β5 OwnCon + β6 DirOwn + β7
InstOwn + β8 ForgnOwn + β9 FrmSize + β10 FrmAge + β11 IndType + β12 AudType+ β13 Rev+
β14 GDP + β15 FX + β16 FDIO + β17 FDII + ε
Table (7-1) – Coefficients for dependent variable ROE
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B
(Constant)

Coefficients

Std. Error

22.129

7.443

BrdSize

.914

.296

BrdIndp

-2.924-

DualSep

Beta

t
2.973

.003

.099

3.087

.002

3.203

-.029-

-.913-

.362

-8.706-

2.674

-.108-

-3.257-

.001

-.928-

1.056

-.029-

-.879-

.380

OwnCon

.014

.027

.024

.507

.612

DirOwn

.079

.063

.039

1.266

.206

InstOwn

.086

.035

.117

2.470

.014

ForgnOwn

.003

.051

.002

.067

.946

FrmSize

-.902-

.449

-.065-

-2.011-

.045

FrmAge

.003

.032

.003

.099

.921

IndustryType

-.680-

1.285

-.015-

-.529-

.597

AudType

4.878

1.504

.102

3.244

.001

.747

.675

.040

1.107

.268

FDIO

1.022

.849

.145

1.204

.229

FDII

-.257-

.203

-.146-

-1.265-

.206

Rev

-5.097-

1.663

-.118-

-3.065-

.002

.005

.003

.064

1.700

.089

Divers

FX

GDP

Table (7-2) – Model Summary for dependent variable ROE

Model
1

Sig.

R

R Square
.216

.047

Adjusted R

Std. Error of the

Square

Estimate
.036

20.1596923
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Table (7-3) – ANOVA for dependent variable ROE
Model
1

Sum of Squares
Regression

df

Mean Square

28344.373

16

1771.523

Residual

577919.559

1422

406.413

Total

606263.932

1438

F
4.359

Sig.
.000

Model 2 examines the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance
measured by ROE. The model is highly significant with F-statistics which is equal to 4.359 and
the p – value equals to 0.000 (less than 1%). The independent variables of the same model
accounts for 4.7%variations in the dependent variable as indicated R2.
Board size
Board size appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.002
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROE. This result is consistent with
previous studies demonstrating that there is a significant positive relationship between board size
and financial performance. (Dalton et al.,1999; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).
From a resource dependence theory point of view, a bigger board leads to greater opportunity for
more relationships, associations, contacts and links and which allows access to resources.
(Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Hillman et al. (2000) also
agrees that directors are considered resourceful towards the firm by providing skills and
expertise needed, as well as, access to suppliers, clients and policymakers.
Even though Yermack (1996) states that there is an inverse relationship between board size and
firm value, however, the count of directors adds additional skilled expertise and performance to
the board until it reaches a certain level where the board size outweighs the additional benefits
that is provided. This raises the possibility that there is an inverted relationship between board
size and firm performance. (Jensen, 1993; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Furthermore, Dalton et
al.(1999) states that there is a positive systematic relationship between board size and firm
performance.
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From an agency theory perspective, boards with larger number of members can exercise better
regulation and control on managers than smaller boards. (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and
Preston, 1995; Donaldson, 1999)
Duality Separation
Duality appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.001 significance
level with firm performance when measured by ROE due to the separation of chairman and CEO
responsibilities. Unifying CEO-Chairman positions is common within Pan Arab countries,
especially in family controlled firm, and is considered to be a Gulf phenomenon.
This result is consistent with and supported by the stewardship theory and the resource
dependency theory, which states unifying the command by having roles of CEO and chairman
held by the same person will facilitate effective actions that are taken by the CEO, which will
lead to better firm performance and lead to better beneficial consequences on shareholder
returns. Hence, CEO duality can be seen as a positive indicator leading to better corporate
performance, because it is seen that the corporation has a clear leadership and vision that can
properly direct the company.
Empirical evidence is also consistent with literature review where that the ROE returns to
shareholders are improved by combining the role of the CEO and chairman positions. Thus, the
results fail to support agency theory and lean towards supporting the stewardship theory
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Gaur et al. (2015) argued that presence of directors and CEO
duality leads to unification of control and command, and consequently higher performance.
Moreover, Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) states that directors with more freedom of decision making
are more likely to implement strategic decisions that will overcome organizational indolence,
which suggests combining CEO and board of directors chairman will lease to less restrictions
and pressures on the CEO during strategy implementation.
Institutional ownership
Institutional ownership appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a
0.014 significance level with firm performance when measured by ROE. The result is consistent
with previous studies suggesting that institutional ownership has a positive effect on firm
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performance (Smith, 1996; Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010; Alshammari,
2015) and that it enhances and improves firm performance (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Maury,
2006). This shows that institutional investors contributes by not only providing financial
investment resources, but also providing non-financial resources such as managerial and
industrial expertise and technical resources in which improves the firm‘s profitability and
performance on the long run which limits potential agency problems. (Douma, George, & Kabir,
2006; Chahine & Tohme, 2009; Al-Musalli and Ismail, 2012)
Firm size
Firm size appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.045
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROE. This result is consistent with
firm size can impact large firms to experience issues of coordination and organization which may
negatively influence performance (Williamson, 1967; Rashid et al. 2010).
Williamson (1967) suggests that the increase in firm size may allow management to encounter
control loss over the firm. Hence, the firm‘s management can impact firm performance
negatively when control loss occurs within the managerial hierarchy. Furthermore, Williamson
(1967) also states that managerial experience is positively related to firm size. Thus, nonexperienced or unqualified management could negatively affect the growth of a firm, which
leads to lower or inefficient firm performance.
Additionally, Rashid et al. (2010) indicates a negative relationship between company size, when
measured by assets and revenue, and a market performance measurement of Tobin‘s Q.
Audit type
Firm size appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.001
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROE when company hires a Big
Four to audit its financials. This result is consistent with Beisland et al. (2015) where it is
revealed that in situations which a significant relationship is present between audit quality and
corporate governance does exist, the relationship is always positive.
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Also, the result shows that Big Four firm could affect a firm‘s performance positively by leading
the firm to implement proper routines and information systems. (Porter et al., 2008; Mohamed et
al., 2013)
Revolution
Revolution appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.002
significance level with firm performance when measured by ROE. This shows that the Arab
Spring uprisings negatively affected firm performance in terms of ROE measurement.
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5.2.3 Model 3
DR = α + β1 BrdSize + β2 BrdIndp + β3 Duality +β4 Div+ β5 OwnCon + β6 DirOwn + β7
InstOwn + β8 ForgnOwn + β9 FrmSize + β10 FrmAge + β11 IndType + β12 AudType+ β13 Rev+
β14 GDP + β15 FX + β16 FDIO + β17 FDII + ε
Table (8-1) – Coefficients for dependent variable DR
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B

Coefficients

Std. Error

(Constant)

-.210-

.074

BrdSize

-.005-

.003

BrdIndp

-.043-

DualSep

Beta

t
-2.839-

.005

-.053-

-1.820-

.069

.032

-.039-

-1.340-

.180

-.093-

.027

-.103-

-3.422-

.001

.015

.011

.043

1.424

.155

2.245E-5

.000

.003

.083

.934

.002

.001

.078

2.738

.006

-.001-

.000

-.099-

-2.279-

.023

ForgnOwn

.002

.001

.123

4.414

.000

FrmSize

.054

.004

.357

12.429

.000

FrmAge

-.001-

.000

-.068-

-2.537-

.011

IndustryType

-.020-

.013

-.042-

-1.574-

.116

AudType

.074

.015

.139

4.895

.000

FX

.015

.007

.073

2.211

.027

FDIO

.008

.009

.107

.993

.321

FDII

.000

.002

-.012-

-.118-

.906

Rev

.034

.017

.071

2.033

.042

-1.194E-5

.000

-.014-

-.411-

.681

Divers
OwnCon
DirOwn
InstOwn

GDP

Table (8-2) – Model Summary for dependent variable DR

Model
1

Sig.

R

R Square
.453

.205

Adjusted R

Std. Error of the

Square

Estimate
.194

.2122263
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Table (8-3) – ANOVA for dependent variable DR
Model
1

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Regression

15.042

17

.885

Residual

58.372

1296

.045

Total

73.414

1313

F
19.646

Sig.
.000

Model 3 examines the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance
measured by ROE. The model is highly significant with F-statistics which is equal to 19.646 and
the p – value equals to 0.000 (less than 1%). The independent variables of the same model
accounts for 20.5%variations in the dependent variable as indicated R2.
Duality Separation
Duality appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.001 significance
level with firm performance when measured by DR due to the separation of chairman and CEO
responsibilities. Unifying CEO-Chairman positions is common within Pan Arab countries,
especially in family controlled firm, and is considered to be a Gulf phenomenon.
This result is consistent with Abore (2007) which finds that there is a positive significant
relationship between CEO duality and firm leverage. Similarly, Bokpin and Arko (2009) states
that there is positive relationship, however insignificant, between CEO duality and firm financial
leverage suggesting that CEO‘s leans towards financing by debt rather than financing by equity
when it comes to firm operation strategy.
In theory, CEO duality restricts information dissemination towards board members which leads
to the increase of agency costs of managerial decision making which leads to the diminishing
board effectiveness in promoting the corporations economic value. (Nelson, 2005; Dahya and
McConnell, 2005; Raheja, 2005)
This leads to the recommendation that the survival of organizations is characterized by the
separation of ownership and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
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Director ownership
Director ownership appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.006
significance level with firm performance when measured by DR. This result is consistent with
previous studies suggesting that director ownership is positively related to debt ratio of firms,
due to managers‘ financial alignment with outside shareholders which would pursue a levered
capital structure which leads to an increase in firm value (Mehran, 1992; Berger et al., 1997).
Moreover, Kim and Sorensen (1986) concluded that that firms with greater director ownership is
more likely to have higher debt ratios compared to firms with minor director ownership.
Moreover, Kamran and Shah (2014) states that director ownership has a positive impact on
Pakistani firms, which supports the understanding mangers that are deeply rooted in a firm are
more influential in terms of corporate decisions that are skewed within their own interest.
Also, this result is consistent with the shareholder theory which explains the ultimate goal for
managers is to use the capital for organizations with a main purpose to increase the returns of the
firm, which in response increases the return of the shareholders. Director ownership is
considered as a control mechanism that may rationalize the managerial decisions of directors,
reduce their moral hazard towards the firm and encourage directors to work more effectively and
efficiently, such change in managerial behaviors is as a result of the interest of managers has
become more aligned with the interest of shareholders as well as reducing agency costs.
(Bathala, 1994)
Institutional ownership
Institutional ownership appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a
0.023 significance level with firm performance when measured by DR. This result is consistent
with Bathala et al., (1994) which found that institutional ownership is negatively related to the
level of debt. Furthermore, once institutional ownership and monitoring within firms increases,
firms may find it ideal to employ minor levels of debt and managerial ownership in order to
control for agency conflicts. (Bathala et al., 1994)
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Foreign ownership
Foreign ownership appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.000
significance level with firm performance when measured by DR. This result is consistent with
Azzam et al. (2013) when examined the effect of foreign ownership on debt showing a positive
significant relationship. The explanation for this is that foreign investors improve firm's
accessibility to finance as the more foreign owners has more shares in the firm.
Foreign shareholders are considered to be long-term investors that brings along their own vast
international expertise and implements organizational and monitoring capabilities within the
investee-firms people. Such implementation is likely to inspire new managerial style, which
creates mutual trust and collaboration between managers and employees, and hence improves the
firm performance (Chahine & Tohme, 2010; Al-Musalli & Ismail, 2012).
Hence, from a resource dependency theory perspective, foreign investors can be regarded as a
competitive advantage for a firm when compared to firms with local investors where foreign
investors are recognized as providers of resources that are needed for an organization, which
further proves that the board of directors is considered to be an important mechanism that links
an organization with the external environment (Chahine & Tohme, 2010; Al-Musalli & Ismail,
2012; Hambrick et al., 2015).
Firm size
Firm size appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.000
significance level with firm performance when measured by DR. This result is consistent with
Sheikh & Wang (2012) on their study regarding firms in Pakistan. They find that firm size is
positively related to the debt ratio, which is supported by the static trade‐off model, suggesting
that large firms should borrow more due to their ability to diversify the risk and benefit from the
tax shields on interest payments. An explanation for the result is that as firms mature and grows
older in age, they are likely to depend less on debt over time and are considered to be wellestablished (Mohamad Ariff et al., 2007)
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Firm age
Firm age appears to have a negative relationship and statistically significant at a 0.011
significance level with firm performance when measured by DR. This result is consistent with
Pfaffermayr et al. (2013) that firm age has a negative impact on debt ratios which indicate that
older firms depends less on debt compared to younger firms. Similarly, it is illustrated that a
firm's debt ratio decreases when they pass their start-up phase period (Berger and Udell, 1998;
Reid, 2003). Also, the result is consistent with Coad et al. (2013) which stated that ageing firms
experience lower debt ratios.
Audit type
Audit type appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.000
significance level with firm performance when measured by DR when company hires a Big Four
to audit its financials. This result is consistent with Beisland et al. (2015) where it is revealed that
in situations which a significant relationship is present between audit quality and corporate
governance does exist, the relationship is always positive.
Also, the result shows that Big Four firm could affect a firm‘s performance positively by leading
the firm to implement proper routines and information systems. (Porter et al., 2008; Mohamed et
al., 2013)
FX
FX appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.027 significance
level with firm performance when measured by DR. The result explains as foreign exchange rate
increases, the debt ratio for a firm increases as well. Bonomo et al. (2003) stated that firms‘
financial condition can deteriorate if they are denominated with foreign debt and the real
exchange rate of the country that the firm is based in depreciates. The excessive debt could lead
the firm into bankruptcy risk. (Bathala et al., 1994)
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Revolution
Revolution appears to have a positive relationship and statistically significant at a 0.042
significance level with firm performance when measured by DR. This shows that the Arab
Spring uprisings positively affected firm leverage in terms of the debt ratio measurement.
5.3 Mann-Whitney Test
After conducing Mann-Whitney U test, results shows that the variables ROA, ROE, ownership
concentration, director ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, firm size, firm
age, foreign exchange rate, outward foreign direct investment, inward foreign direct investment
and GDP are all statistically significant with a 0.000 significance level for all variables (except
for foreign exchange rate which is statistically significant with a 0.023 significance level).
Moreover, the variables DR, board size, board independence, duality separation, diversity,
industry type and audit type are statistically insignificant.
The variables ROA, ROE, foreign exchange rate, outward foreign direct investment and inward
foreign direct investment were a higher mean rank before the Arab Spring uprising compared to
during/after the Arab Spring uprising. On the other hand, the variables ownership concentration,
director ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, firm size, firm age and GDP
were a higher mean rank during/after the Arab Spring uprising compared to before the Arab
Spring uprising.
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Table (9-1) Mann-Whitney Test Statistics for group variable ‘Rev’
Mann-Whitney
U

Asymp. Sig. (2Wilcoxon W

Z

tailed)

ROA

372850.500

778300.500

-4.149-

.000

ROE

365547.000

761152.000

-4.308-

.000

DR

409365.000

845076.000

-1.207-

.228

BrdSize

359725.500

612841.500

-.912-

.362

BrdIndp

358544.500

611660.500

-1.020-

.308

DualSep

362860.500

615976.500

-1.364-

.173

Divers

367991.500

621107.500

-.168-

.866

OwnCon

333844.000

939394.000

-18.895-

.000

DirOwn

493645.500

1099195.500

-11.214-

.000

InstOwn

401980.000

1007530.000

-14.504-

.000

ForgnOwn

572209.000

1177759.000

-3.550-

.000

FrmSize

370160.500

806805.500

-4.684-

.000

FrmAge

513524.500

1081169.500

-5.591-

.000

IndustryType

632812.500

1266187.500

.000

1.000

AudType

579500.000

1190565.000

-.154-

.878

FX

599161.000

1232536.000

-2.271-

.023

FDIO

160798.000

794173.000

-30.651-

.000

FDII

178852.000

812227.000

-29.478-

.000

GDP

265507.000

684577.000

-16.602-

.000
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

71

6. Summary and Conclusion
The thesis is about the effect of corporate governance on firm performance in Pan Arab
countries. This paper provides an insight understanding of the corporate governance practices the
effect of such corporate governance practices on firm performance which is measured using
ROA, ROE and Debt ratio in 225 firms, excluding financial firms, operating in 11 countries and
stock markets which are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates.
The essence of corporate governance is mainly based on the characteristics of integrity,
openness, fairness, professionalism and accountability, hence, its implementation is considered
to be crucial within an institution and essential for management and business dynamics alike.
The adoption of corporate governance mechanisms ensures to achieve a balance between the
essential powers of the Board of Directors and their proper accountability, financial stability,
economic efficiency, sustainable growth and corporate responsibility.
The paper initially starts with the importance of corporate governance in academic literature and
on corporations, as well as its significance over the course of history. Different corporate
governance definitions are then examined by using diverse views from various academic
literatures and observing governance from different perspectives and point of views for each
individual or body involved.
A number of corporate governance theories, their evolution and their implementation into the
corporate structure of different companies were mentioned to explore views. The fundamental
corporate governance theories discussed within this study was initiated with the agency theory,
which later expanded into the stewardship theory and stakeholder theory and later evolved to
resource dependency theory, in addition to, the shareholder theory. Different corporate
governance theories and guidelines were previously discussed that addresses the cause and effect
on different corporate governance variables, and therefore, it is suggested that a combination of
several theories along with the implementation of a good fit guideline is best to describe an
effective governance practice rather than hypothesizing corporate governance based on a single
theory or replicating a guideline that is not best fit for a firm or an industry.
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Three important and commonly recognized corporate governance codes and guidelines was
mentioned for the purpose of exploring different governance principles and practices that are
heavily referenced by institutions and governmental bodies, such as The Cadbury Report (1992)
developed in the United Kingdom, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance (1999 and 2004) which its headquarters is located
in France, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Law (2002) developed in the United States of America. Later
on, a brief on corporate governance in the Middle East which is considered to be one of the
emerging markets in which corporate governance model has been seen as a new thought, and
despite the constant reforms and demands being made as a result of implementing corporate
governance practices, challenges has arisen as a result of the Arab Spring aftermath that has
swept the entire region due to the widespread of corruption and embedded mal-governance.
Addressing such challenges properly and with appropriate implementation, corporate governance
should lead to even further reform.
Chapter three introduces the development of the seventeen hypotheses supported by different
literature reviews. Chapter four discusses the research methodology of the study such as
population and sample selection, data collection, variable measurement and definition and three
regression models in order to examine the effect of corporate governance on firm performance in
Pan-Arab countries.
Chapter five demonstrates the findings and analysis for the following three regression models:


Model 1 shows the effect of corporate governance on firm performance measured by
ROA. Results show that there is a significant positive relationship with board size,
institutional ownership, audit type on firm performance measured by ROA, also there a
significant negative relationship with duality separation, foreign ownership, firm size and
the revolution variable on firm performance measured by ROA.



Model 2 shows the effect of corporate governance on firm performance measured by
ROE. Results show that there is a significant positive relationship with board size,
institutional ownership, audit type on firm performance measured by ROE, also there a

73

significant negative relationship with duality separation, firm size and the revolution
variable on firm performance measured by ROE.


Model 3 shows the effect of corporate governance on firm performance measured by
Debt Ratio. Results show that there is a significant positive relationship with director
ownership, foreign ownership, firm size, foreign exchange rate and the revolution
variable on firm performance measured by Debt Ratio, also there a significant negative
relationship with duality separation, institutional ownership and firm age on firm
performance measured by ROE.

After conducing Mann-Whitney U test, results shows that the variables ROA, ROE, ownership
concentration, director ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, firm size, firm
age, foreign exchange rate, outward foreign direct investment, inward foreign direct investment
and GDP are all statistically significant with a 0.000 significance level for all variables (except
for foreign exchange rate which is statistically significant with a 0.023 significance level).
The variables ROA, ROE, foreign exchange rate, outward foreign direct investment and inward
foreign direct investment were a higher mean rank before the Arab Spring uprising compared to
during/after the Arab Spring uprising. On the other hand, the variables ownership concentration,
director ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, firm size, firm age and GDP
were a higher mean rank during/after the Arab Spring uprising compared to before the Arab
Spring uprising.
6.1 Research limitations

The issue of data availability in terms of annual reports for companies in such companies was a
main issue in order to extract the independent variables board size, board independence, duality
and diversity. The hardship in extracting annual reports over the time frame this study follows
was due to the following:
1- Companies were not required or obligated by the law or the financial regulator of the
country to publish such reports at that time
2- Companies were not listed in the stock exchange or did not exist at that time
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3- Companies did publish annual report, however does not mention the category of directors
4- Companies no longer publishes previous annual reports considering it out-dated
5- In some cases, the website for a company does not exist, inactive or is completely outdated
After referencing and researching many papers with similar research, annual reports can still be
obtained by independent and authorized distributor of information for listed companies in each
country‘s stock exchange. For example, Egypt for Information Dissemination (egID) is the sole
aggregator and authorized distributor of the Egyptian stock exchange‘s (EGX) listed companies‘
information and could provide financial information, annual reports and other financial reports
related to companies listed on the EGX stock exchange. However, such services can only be
obtained in exchange for a certain fees.

Other research limitation faced was limited data availability in terms of the dependent variables
ROA, ROE and DR while extracting the data from ORBIS for the companies over the years was
due to the following:
1- Financial data for fiscal year 2015 might not had been available during the date of
extraction
2- Financial data was not available for some companies and couldn‘t be obtained by ORBIS
3- Companies did not exist at that time

It is worth to mention that it is possible to gather some of the missing dependent variables by
using annual reports and financial statements. However, such method was not used in order to
unify the collection of data and extracting it from a single source, as well as, time constraints.
Similarly, research limitation faced was data availability in terms of the economic variables for
some countries in particular years while extracting from the database Zawya.

6.2 Quality of information

During the extraction of independent variables board size, board independence, duality and
diversity from annual and board reports, the following was noticed:
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1- Some board member would resign during the fiscal year and would be replaced with
another board member. Both board members would be counted as a single board
member.
2- Some board member would resign during the fiscal year and would not be replaced.
Counting the resigned board member within board size will depend on the number board
meetings took place during the year, if the resigned board member attended more than
half of the meetings, then the resigned board member will be counted within the board
size. If board meetings were not mentioned within the annual report, the date of
resignation will be used as a measurement where the resigned board member is counted
within board size if resignation date was after September 30th.
3- Annual and board reports for a fiscal year are usually published 1-3 months after the
fiscal year ends. The possibility of minor changes within the board might occur during
the mentioned period. Some companies advertise its new board as its final line-up for the
previous fiscal year which might not capture the precise board size and independence.

6.3 Future Research

The study can be further developed by increasing the sample of companies in each country and
incorporate and use other controllable variables such as taking in consideration different political
and cultural factors depending on the country. Furthermore, the ‗DR‘ variable should be included
as an independent variable within the ‗ROA‘ and ‗ROE‘ models, whereas debt is considered to
be an important factor in determining debt. Also, the ‗ROA‘ and ‗ROE‘ variables should be
included as independent variables within the ‗DR‘ model as well.
Future research should explore the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on a sectorial
level, also its effects of various degrees of company size (measured in terms of total assets) for
small, medium and large companies. Also, similar studies such as this can be conducted on
single countries within the Middle East.
Even though it has been included with the models, the independent variable ‗FX‘ which
represents the foreign exchange rate is suggested to be removed within future studies due to most
Pan Arab countries, especially in the GCC, has a fixed rate currency which is usually controlled
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by the government if the country. Hence, keeping the independent variable in the model will not
represent the true relationship on firm performance.
Rather using dummy variables to categorize a firm‘s industry based on either service or
manufacturing, it is best to use dummy variables based on sectorial level for the firms, where the
sector level of a firm is an important factor for profitability.
In terms of ownership concentration, it is best to consider the biggest three to five shareholders
rather than considering shareholders with 5% of shares or more. The reason is because there
might be many shareholders that owns 5% of shares within a company, and hence, doesn‘t
indicate that there is an ownership concentration.
Further investigation can be examined regarding the reasons which led to the significance for the
variables test in the Mann-Whitney Test before and during/after the Arab Spring uprising.
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Appendix (1)
Table (9-2) Mann-Whitney Test Ranks
Rev
ROA

ROE

DR

BrdSize

BrdIndp

DualSep

Divers

OwnCon

DirOwn

InstOwn

ForgnOwn

N

Mean Rank

Sum of Ranks

.0000

933

967.37

902560.50

1.0000

900

864.78

778300.50

Total

1833

.0000

931

962.36

895958.00

1.0000

889

856.19

761152.00

Total

1820

.0000

933

905.76

845076.00

1.0000

907

935.66

848644.00

Total

1840

.0000

711

861.94

612841.50

1.0000

1038

883.94

917533.50

Total

1749

.0000

711

860.28

611660.50

1.0000

1038

885.08

918714.50

Total

1749

.0000

711

866.35

615976.50

1.0000

1038

880.92

914398.50

Total

1749

.0000

711

873.57

621107.50

1.0000

1038

875.98

909267.50

Total

1749

.0000

1100

853.99

939394.00

1.0000

1099

1346.23

1479506.00

Total

2199

.0000

1100

999.27

1099195.50

1.0000

1099

1200.82

1319704.50

Total

2199

.0000

1100

915.94

1007530.00

1.0000

1099

1284.23

1411370.00

Total

2199

.0000

1100

1070.69

1177759.00

1.0000

1099

1129.34

1241141.00

Total

2199
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FrmSize

FrmAge

IndustryType

AudType

FX

FDIO

FDII

GDP

.0000

934

863.82

806805.50

1.0000

907

979.88

888755.50

Total

1841

.0000

1065

1015.18

1081169.50

1.0000

1119

1166.09

1304850.50

Total

2184

.0000

1125

1125.50

1266187.50

1.0000

1125

1125.50

1266187.50

Total

2250

.0000

1052

1080.64

1136838.00

1.0000

1105

1077.43

1190565.00

Total

2157

.0000

1125

1155.41

1299839.00

1.0000

1125

1095.59

1232536.00

Total

2250

.0000

1125

1545.07

1738202.00

1.0000

1125

705.93

794173.00

Total

2250

.0000

1125

1529.02

1720148.00

1.0000

1125

721.98

812227.00

Total

2250

.0000

915

748.17

684577.00

1.0000

1028

1171.22

1204019.00

Total

1943

Table (9-3) Mann-Whitney T-Test Group Statistics
Rev
ROA

ROE

DR

BrdSize

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

.0000

933

8.474689

8.9505681

.2930284

1.0000

900

6.998038

9.0312081

.3010403

.0000

931

14.685404

16.1292923

.5286162

1.0000

889

11.301397

22.7204779

.7620204

.0000

933

.417275

.2277566

.0074564

1.0000

907

.431358

.2320194

.0077041

.0000

711

8.34

2.303

.086

1.0000

1038

8.41

2.153

.067
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BrdIndp

DualSep

Divers

OwnCon

DirOwn

InstOwn

ForgnOwn

FrmSize

FrmAge

IndustryType

AudType

FX

FDIO

FDII

GDP

.0000

711

.792600

.2040215

.0076514

1.0000

1038

.796216

.2124805

.0065951

.0000

711

.92

.267

.010

1.0000

1038

.94

.239

.007

.0000

711

.21

.659

.025

1.0000

1038

.19

.607

.019

.0000

1100

19.112391

30.6545079

.9242682

1.0000

1099

46.104377

36.8464686

1.1114682

.0000

1100

1.816455

7.9955158

.2410739

1.0000

1099

5.024413

11.2272223

.3386675

.0000

1100

14.766536

26.1111175

.7872798

1.0000

1099

28.731793

29.1391187

.8789771

.0000

1100

3.694127

13.2331244

.3989937

1.0000

1099

4.406515

13.4048499

.4043553

.0000

934

13.155227

1.5366897

.0502820

1.0000

907

13.493789

1.6364191

.0543364

.0000

1065

23.453521

19.8167818

.6072371

1.0000

1119

27.201072

20.1182052

.6014149

.0000

1125

.622222

.4850473

.0144613

1.0000

1125

.622222

.4850473

.0144613

.0000

1052

.722433

.4480113

.0138128

1.0000

1105

.719457

.4494680

.0135213

.0000

1125

.843705

1.1116813

.0331439

1.0000

1125

.822631

1.1009435

.0328238

.0000

1125

5.479556

3.1702113

.0945174

1.0000

1125

1.704142

1.1027549

.0328778

.0000

1125

22.557751

13.0888469

.3902340

1.0000

1125

7.717956

5.1549046

.1536896

.0000

915

242.173595

193.9898857

6.4131078

1.0000

1028

447.321025

283.6121234

8.8456191
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